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BANK CHARGE CARDS: NEW CASH 
OR NEW CREDIT 
Roland E. Brandel* and Carl A. Leonard** 
1. INTRODUCTION 
BANK charge cards have become a subject of interest only recently, but that interest has been intense. They have provided the im-
petus for legislative inquiry and statutes at both the state and federal 
levels, and hearings and regulations by such agencies as the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve Board. Many articles 
are appearing in both the mass media and professional journals, not 
all of which, at the risk of significant understatement, have been 
flattering to the charge card industry. Urgings to suppress the "plastic 
menace" are not uncommon. 
The entire concept of bank charge cards and interchange systems 
is novel, imaginative, and complex. Those who innovated learned 
rapidly, albeit painfully, from that best of teachers, experience. The 
early experiences have induced many changes in the business prac-
tices of the bank charge card industry. Because of the explosive na-
ture of the growth of the industry, much of the material describing 
the industry and much of the legislation directed toward it has dealt 
with historical problems, not with the industry's current condition. 
By the time the author of an article or a legislative proposal has 
accumulated the relevant facts and statistics, his data may no longer 
reflect the current status of the industry. 
This Article will deal with one highly controversial aspect of the 
use of bank charge cards: the issue whether a consumer who pur-
chases goods or services from a merchant and pays for them by using 
a bank charge card should be able to assert against ·the bank that 
issued the charge card legal defenses that he may have against the 
merchant. It will also describe, as of the· present, the operations of 
the bank charge card industry's highly sophisticated credit extension 
and payment system. More importantly, to stave off instant obsoles-
cence, it will describe some discernible trends that should be con-
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sidered in arriving at a proper resolution of the principal issue under 
discussion, so that the resolution will serve as well the near term 
future as it does the present. 
The issue is ripe for resolution. Most states have not yet dealt with 
the issue of the assertability of consumer defenses in the bank charge 
card context, but cases raising the issue are now being litigated. 
The Massachusetts legislature recently dealt with the problem/ as 
did the National Consumer Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code, which took very different approaches to it.2 Legislation on the 
issue has been introduced in Congress and in the State of New York 
and is likely to be introduced in other state legislatures in the near 
future.3 The Federal Trade Commission has recently promulgated a 
proposed rule on the preservation of buyer's defenses.4 
It is the premise of this Article that the bank charge card systems 
constitute a new, highly useful, and efficient payment and credit 
mechanism; that any decision-making body that promulgates a rule 
on the issue of the assertability of consumer defenses must carefully 
evaluate the true functions of bank charge cards, particularly their 
role as part of a sophisticated payment mechanism, and weigh the 
relative interests of the consuming public, merchants, and members 
of the banking industry to derive the best solution for society; that 
courts are ill-equipped to perform this function; and, that, given the 
national and international usage of bank charge cards, a uniform rule 
is imperative. The Article will first analyze each of these premises 
and then proceed to suggest a rule that seems effectively to balance 
the various interests involved. 
. 
II. OPERATIONAL AsPECTS OF BANK 
CHARGE CARD SYSTEMS 
It is of little use to attempt to evaluate proposed rules relating 
to bank charge card systems unless one understands the processes 
involved and economic realities inherent in their operation. Won-
derfully consistent and persuasive arguments can be constructed by 
1. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1970). Quaere whether this provision 
would cover multiparty charge card systems, in which the issuer and seller are not 
parties to a "prior agreement." See also note 101 infra. 
2. Compare NATIONAL CONSUMER Ac:r §§ 2.406(1), (2)(g) (First Final Draft) [here-
inafter NCA] with UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 1.301(9), 3.106(3) [hereinafter 
UCCC]. See note 49 infra. The UCCC has been adopted in Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, 
Utah, and Wyoming and is being considered by the legislatures of 22 states. I CCH 
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,J,J 4770-71 (1971). 
3. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 169 (1971); S. 6483-A, N.Y. Legis., 1971-1972 Reg. Sess. 
(April 22, 1971). 
4. Proposed FTC Reg. § 433.1, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971). 
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consumer advocates on the one hand and by commercial interests 
involved in bank charge card transactions on the other by simply 
ignoring some important aspects of the relationships between the 
many parties to a charge card transaction. What follows, then, is 
an analysis of how bank charge card systems operate and some indi-
cation of predictable future modifications of those systems. 
Paramount among the several parties to bank charge card trans-
actions" is a bank (issuer) that issues charge cards to the public. The 
issuer establishes an account on behalf of the person ( cardholder) to 
whom the card is issued, and the cardholder and issuer enter into an 
agreement that governs their relationship. The cardholder agreement 
establishes a line of credit under which the cardholder may incur 
obligations to the issuer by a purchase of goods or services or through 
a cash advance.6 Typically, it provides two options to the cardholder: 
he may either make payment in full within a specified period after 
being billed, free of finance charges, or he may defer payments.7 At 
the time of the transaction, the cardholder may not have decided 
which option he will use; his decision may readily be deferred until 
the time the initial payment is due. The cardholder must then decide 
whether to use his card as a mere medium of exchange or "conve-
nience card," or whether to assume the role of a borrower with re-
spect to the issuer. 
Merchants enter into agreements with any bank ( depositary 
bank), wherever located, that is a member of the interchange system 
to which the issuer belongs. These agreements enable them to accept 
evidences of obligations of the cardholder to the issuer (sales slips) 
as payment for goods and services. Typically, the merchant agreement 
will provide that the merchant must honor all charge cards issued by 
a member bank of the interchange system that are properly presented 
to him to pay for goods or services. The merchant must also perform 
certain routine clerical acts in filling out the sales slip. He will typi-
cally then deposit the sales slip in an ordinary checking account at 
5. Bank charge card transactions are referred to in this Article as multiparty: 
they involve a consumer, a merchant, and, frequently, two or more banks. This 
reference serves to distinguish them from seller charge card plans and tripartite 
plans such as Diners Club. Although the term "tripartite" has been used in some 
literature to distinguish bank charge card transactions from two-party, or seller, 
charge card plans, we will not refer to bank charge card transactions as tripartite 
in this Article. Such a reference would obscure an important point-that most bank 
charge card transactions are multiparty-which is crucial to a proper understanding 
of the relationship of the parties. 
6. A cash advance involves a direct disbursement of cash to a cardholder by a bank. 
7. FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, REPORT: BANK CREDIT-CARI> AND CHECK-CREDIT PLANS 
12 (1968) [hereinafter FED. R.EsERVE SYs., REP.]; Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card 
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L REv. 459, 464 (1960). 
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the depositary bank with which he has a merchant agreement and 
will receive a credit to his account just as if he had deposited cash or 
a check. The depositary bank will clear and forward any sales slips 
deposited with it through an interchange system in much the same 
fashion that checks are cleared. The sales slip will be forwarded to 
the issuer to be charged to the account of the cardholder who in-
curred the obligation to the issuer in the transaction with the mer-
chant. The issuer will then periodically bill its cardholder. 
Banks become part of an interchange system by agreeing among 
themselves to abide by certain rules and regulations that prescribe 
the techniques and conditions under which the interchange process 
will operate. These rules and regulations serve the same function for 
charge card systems as the rules of the city check clearinghouse asso-
ciations, 8 the Federal Reserve Collection System,9 and article 4 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code provide for the check system. 
The depositary bank and the issuer may be separated by thousands 
of miles, and the interchange clearing process may involve two or more 
regional clearing associations and several banks. For example, assume 
that an Ithaca, New York resident who is on vacation and who pos-
sesses a charge card issued to him by his local bank purchases goods 
from a Redding, California merchant who has entered into a mer-
chant agreement with a depositary bank in Redding. The sales slip 
generated from that transaction would be deposited by the merchant 
in his account in the Redding depositary bank; the depositary bank 
would fonvard the sales slip to the western regional charge card asso-
ciation to which it belongs; the western regional association would 
transmit the slip to an eastern regional association, which in tum 
would forward the slip to the Ithaca issuer for debiting to the card-
holder's account.10 
This wide-ranging consumer convenience has been made econom-
ically feasible by the establishment, within the framework of charge 
card systems, of an account for the consumer against which multiple 
drawings may be made and by the use of highly advanced technology 
in administering such systems. A charge card system must be highly 
efficient to exist: the cost per transaction must be low or the public 
could not afford to pay for the convenience offered. 
8. See note 10 infra. 
9. Fed. Reserve Bd. Reg. J, 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-.16 (1970). 
10. See generally Coha, Credit Card Pace Accelerates, BANKERS MONTHLY, Oct. 15, 
1968, at 21; FED. REsERVE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 9-10, 24-25; Franklin, Significance 
of Interchange for Bank Credit Card Plans, BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE, Aug. 1968, 
at 28; Stevens, The Expanding Role of Bank Charge Card Associations, BANKING, Nov. 
1969, at 47. Clearing can be more involved when correspondent or affiliated banks 
are interjected into the process. 
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Costs within the systems may be decreased through economies 
that are administrative in nature. Only one review of credit-worthi-
ness need be made-at the time the account is established-in con-
trast to separate credit inquiries that would have to be made if 
separate loans were involved in each transaction. Although several 
extensions of credit may have been charged against an account, only 
one billing per cycle need be made, thus affording the system the 
same operating economies as those achieved in services now offered 
to consumers wherein they can consolidate their separate debts.11 
The primary economies, however, are achieved by highly auto-
mated data processing systems used in clearing and accounting for 
charge card transactions. Such devices as optical scanners, encoders, 
readers, and computers are employed so that sales slips can be machine 
processed free of the interruption, errors, and high cost attributable 
to manual processing. Computers balance accounts automatically be-
tween banks, adjust cardholder accounts, and calculate any applic-
able finance charges; they also analyze rapidly, process, and dissemi-
nate information regarding abnormal activity in the use of a charge 
card, thereby lowering the potential for financial loss by users and 
operators of charge card systems resulting from criminal activity. 
The resultant smooth, low-cost flow of machine processable paper is 
a prerequisite for this consumer service.12 With rapid developments 
in the industry, however, even the sales slip is already becoming an 
anachronism because of the expense involved in its processing. Proto-
type equipment exists that would eliminate the transfer of docu-
ments; such equipment will soon allow a charge card transaction to 
take place electronically, instantly.13 
III. USE OF CHARGE CARDS HAS PRODUCED 
SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC BENEFITS 
Bank charge card systems are new: they achieved significant mar-
ket impact as recently as 1959 with the advent of the BankAmeri-
card.H Master Charge cards followed in 1967. The operations of 
11. Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 85 BANKING 
L.J. 941, 961 (1968); Fm. REsERVE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 57-58. 
12. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND. &: 
COM. L. REv. 485, 513-17 (1966-67). 
13. See text accompanying notes 64 &: 65 infra. Examples of the possibilities for 
discarding the sales slip are contained in the report of the Special Committee on 
Paperless Entries (SCOPE) appointed by the Los Angeles and San Francisco Clearing 
House Associations, dated August 24, 1970, and a procedural guide prepared by that 
committee. Some of the first applications proposed therein, such as automatic payment 
of insurance premiums and utility bills, are already being contemplated as natural 
extensions of bank charge card use. 
14. Comment, supra note 7, at 462. 
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these two major bank charge card interchange systems are now inter-
national in scope.15 Banks belonging to the Master Charge inter-
change system, for instance, number more than 5,000, operating offi-
ces in forty-nine states and many foreign countries throughout the 
world.16 Banks issue cards in most of these jurisdictions and mer-
chants in all of them accept the charge card as a medium of exchange 
in the same way they accept cash. In the Master Charge system alone, 
the merchants that will accept Master Charge cards now number 
approximately 625,000 and member banks have outstanding 36 mil-
lion charge cards.17 During 1970, more than 6.1 billion dollars in 
sales in the United States were attributed to all bank charge cards in 
more than 320 million separate transactions.18 
Bank charge card services have received a truly phenomenal 
acceptance by the public in a short period of time. They have been 
viewed by many analysts as an innovation that will eventually replace 
the use of money or checks as a medium of exchange in consumer 
transactions.19 Our present system of cash payment, it is said, will 
soon be viewed as being as archaic as the barter system of days gone 
by now appears to twentieth century man. Even now it is apparent, 
both by virtue of the universal acceptance of bank charge cards and 
the advantages of their use, that they are a device of significant utility 
to consumers, businessmen, and banks alike. 
In the near future, charge cards will be used to actuate electronic-
input terminals at retail establishments, thereby eliminating the 
costly transfer of documents.20 Electronic-terminal devices are cur-
15. See, e.g., Fukushima, Japan Joins the Rush to Credit Cards, BURROUGHS 
Cr.EAruNG HousE, Nov. 1968, at 32; Matthews, Franch Succumbs to Credit Card Trend, 
BURROUGHS CLEARING HousE, July 1969, at 28; Main Money Cards for UK Residents, 
BANKER, Feb. 1970, at 230; Bank Credit Cards Going International, BURROUGHS CLEARING 
HousE, Aug. 1968, at 54; New Look in Credit Cards, FINANCIAL WORLD, Jan. 8, 1969, 
at 11; San Francisco Chronicle, July 13, 1970, at 18, col. 2. 
16. Interbank Card Association, 1970 Fourth Quarter Statistical Summary, on file 
at the offices of the Michigan Law Review. 
17. Id. Federally insured commercial banks had nearly 60 million credit cards 
outstanding at the end of 1969. Hearings pursuant to H.R. Res. 66 Before the Sub-
comm. on Special Small Business Problems of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1970). 
18. See note 16 supra; San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1971, at 59, col. 5. 
The number of separate transactions was derived by dividing total amount of sales 
revenue by an average transaction amount of $19. 
19. See generally Chait, Marketing in the Money Card Society, CALIF. MANAGEMENT 
R.Ev., Fall 1968, at 3; Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals 
for the Uniform Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 YALE L.J. 788 (1966); 
Weiss, Automatic Vendor Poises for Credit Card Blast-off, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 17, 
1969, at 56; Describes Checkless Society of Future, Impact on Insurance, NATIONAL 
UNDERWRITER (Life and Health Insurance ed.), Nov. 2, 1968, at 15. 
20. It has been estimated that, in 1967, nearly 20 billion checks were cleared at a 
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rently being tested in conjunction with food vending machines, air-
line reservation and charge systems, and self-service gasoline stations .. 
These developments indicate that charge cards will, in the near fu-
ture, play a principal role in the establishment of an electronic 
money-transfer system. It has been predicted that these developments 
will lower retail costs to the benefit of everyone.21 
Consumers receive the major benefits to be derived from the use 
of interchange charge cards. They may carry a single charge card 
instead of many cards or money. A consumer using his card inter-
nationally is not subjected to the vexations of exchanging currency 
as he travels from one country to another; the card in that respect 
amounts to an internationally recognized unit of currency. A con-
sumer is also provided with a well-documented record at the end of 
every month of goods and services that he has purchased during that 
month. Moreover, he need not worry about great personal financial 
loss as a result of theft, fire, or other misfortune, which loss would be 
a disaster if it involved money, but would be a mere inconvenience 
if it involved his charge card.22 Nor need the consumer worry about 
the supply of cash in his pocket at a given moment in time as charge 
cards become more universally accepted as a medium of exchange. 
The consumer need no longer adjust his on-hand cash position daily; 
he need only balance his cash position on a cyclical basis, typically 
monthly.23 
Cardholders seem to view most charge card transactions as re-
placements for payment in cash. A cardholder expects to receive 
goods and services upon presentment of his charge card just as he 
would upon presentment of cash, and he expects them upon the same 
terms. By using a charge card he is not subject to any of the incon-
veniences or costs associated with the use of secondary means of pay-
ment, such as travelers checks or personal checks, the latter of which 
may frequently be unacceptable even in the locality in which the 
cardholder resides and most certainly will be unacceptable on a 
national or international basis. 
cost of almost 4 billion dollars. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at 80, col. 1. See also 
Chait, supra note 19, at 3; FED. REsERvE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 20. 
21. Weiss, supra note 19, at 58. 
22. Consumer responsibility for loss resulting from unauthorized use of his credit 
card is limited by federal legislation, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970), and, in some cases, 
state legislation. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. CODE § 1718 (West Supp. 1971): ILL. ANN. STAT. 
ch. 121-1/2, § 381-82 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971). 
2!1. Davenport, supra note 11, at 961; FED. REsERvE SYS., REP., supra note 7, at 57-58. 
National advertising for both the Bank Americard and Master Charge plans empha-
sizes the responsible use of the charge card and its utility as a money management 
device. .AMEluCAN BANUR, March 10, 1971, at 1, col. 3. 
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Merchants also benefit from the acceptance of charge cards and 
are willing to treat a charge card transaction as a replacement for 
cash payment. They are typically protected by the terms of their 
merchant agreements from risks associated with accepting payment in 
a noncash form. For instance, they avoid certain risks associated with 
the acceptance of a check in payment, such as the risk of forgery or 
lack of funds in the purchaser's checking account.24 The acceptance 
of a bank charge card may be even safer than acceptance of cash itself 
in that the merchant is also protected from the risk of counterfeit. A 
merchant knows that he will receive an immediate credit in his de-
mand deposit account when he deposits a sales slip, just as he would 
if he deposited cash. Merchants are also freed from the risk of theft 
in a day when crime is increasing. So valued is this feature by some 
that certain businesses, which have traditionally been plagued by a 
high rate of theft, have begun to accept only correct change or charge 
cards during hours of special risk.25 
Finally, in those instances in which the cardholder purchases 
goods or services and then decides to exercise his option to repay in 
installments, the extension of credit is accomplished more economic-
ally than if the merchant had operated his own charge program or if 
the bank had extended a series of separate loans to cover the cost of 
the goods or services purchased. Such lower costs probably benefit 
the consumer in the form of lower prices for the products and services 
he purchases. 
Such, then, is the business context in which the question arises 
whether a consumer should have the right to assert against the bank 
that issued his charge card defenses that he may have against a mer-
chant. Because of the recentness and the uniqueness of bank charge 
card services, there is little statutory or case law that is directly ap-
plicable to the complex relationships that exist among the many 
parties to charge card transactions.26 Such relationships have thus 
far been governed primarily by agreement of the parties concerned. 
Discussion of the issue, th1..refore, particularly before the judiciary, 
has been characterized by attempts to analogize the credit card trans-
action to similar transactions.27 
24. UNIFORM Com.IERCIAL CODE §§ 3-417(2), 3-510, 4-207(2), 4-212 [hereinafter UCC]; 
See generally H. BAILEY, THE LAw OF BANK CHECKS §§ 12.1, .23, .24 (4th ed. 1969). 
25. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1970, at 51, col. 2; The Oil Daily, May 15, 1970, 
at 4, col. 5; The Oil Daily, March 17, 1970, at 20, col. 1. 
26. Davenport, supra note 11, at 945-47; Bergsten, supra note 12, at 485; Comment, 
supra note 7, at 459; Comment, Bank Credit Plans: Innovations in Consumer Financing, 
1 LoYoLA (L.A.) L. REv. 49, 50 (1968) [hereinafter Comment, Bank Credit Plans]. 
27. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 23-40, Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11-16, Payne 
v. Filter Queen of Hayward, Inc., Civil No. 384418 (Alameda County Super. Ct. (Cal.), 
June 16, 1969), appeal docketed, Civil No. 27751 (Ct. App. Cal., May 13, 1970), 
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IV. THE CoNsUMER's PosmoN 
A consumer has the ability to assert defenses against a merchant's 
attempts to collect amounts due and, therefore, enjoys a tactical ad-
vantage if the merchandise or services purchased on credit are un-
satisfactory. The merchant must take the initiative; he must seek out 
the consumer for payment. If the consumer is forced to take the 
initiative to obtain a return of amounts paid, it is argued that he 
may not be able to assert effectively his rights against merchants 
because he may have insufficient knowledge or resources to do so. 
A consumer advocate28 may recognize the benefits obtainable through 
use of charge cards; yet he may view bank charge card transactions 
as a replacement for a direct extension of credit by a retail merchant. 
Therefore, he would argue that a consumer should possess the same 
rights against any party seeking to collect amounts due, whether the 
creditor is a merchant or a bank that has issued the consumer a 
charge card. 
Consumer advocates argue that placing liability on banks will 
have the salutary effect of inducing banks to police merchants' activi-
ties and that they are in a better position than the consumer to do 
so.20 Only financially sound merchants that sell high quality goods 
and services will be allowed to accept bank charge cards, and con-
sumers will thereby have merchants screened on their behalf. Con-
sumers will therefore presumably enjoy protection from any defect 
in merchandise purchased, from the bad faith of the merchant in 
settling a dispute, and from the merchant's insolvency. Moreover, 
the mere association of the names and service marks of prestigious 
banks and their charge cards gives consumers a sense of confidence 
in the merchants accepting the bank charge cards, and banks should 
justify that expectation. Finally, the consumer advocate can rely on 
the seemingly irrefutable premise that banks can better absorb or 
spread losses than can individual consumers. 
Unscrupulous merchants have used various techniques to place 
on consumers the onus of taking the initiative to resolve any dispute. 
These techniques have included the assignment to a related third 
party of the consumer's obligation to the merchant or the negotiation 
to a third party of a negotiable instrument executed by the consumer. 
Such techniques have clearly been used in some instances to deny the 
28. As used in this Article, "consumer advocate" refers not only to those persons 
who have presented the consumer's position in the courts and the legislatures, but 
also to those who have presented it-possibly in a more objective manner-in law 
review articles. 
29. See Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk 
Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 
UCLA L. R.Ev. 879, 899-900 n.83 (1967). 
1042 Michigan Law Review [Vol 69:1033 
consumer the ability effectively to assert defenses that he may have 
against a merchant. Such an assignment or negotiation would, in 
most jurisdictions, free the holder of the obligation from defenses as 
either an assignee for value30 or a holder in due course of a nego-
tiable instrument.31 
Legislatures have taken steps to deprive merchants of these tech-
niques for compelling consumers to bring an affirmative action by 
interjecting third parties into the merchant-consumer transaction.82 
Simultaneously, courts, at a pace that has varied from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, have been developing theories to support the proposi-
tion that a consumer may assert defenses against certain parties who 
were not sellers, but who hold a promise to pay resulting from a 
consumer transaction and possess certain special relationships to the 
sales transaction.33 It is now being argued, before both judicial and 
legislative forums, that a consumer's rights in credit transactions 
should not depend on the form in which the credit is extended and 
that the consumer should be able to assert against any related party 
attempting to collect the debt created in a consumer credit trans-
action defenses he has against the seller. Consumer advocates suggest 
that the charge card transaction is in reality tantamount to an assign-
ment for value to the bank of the consumer's obligation to the mer-
chant. Characterizing the transaction in accordance with this "assign-
ment theory,''34 they would argue that the credit card sale should be 
subject to the same doctrines that are being used to penetrate the 
holder-in-due-course and assignee-for-value defenses in other con-
sumer credit transactions. 
The developing doctrines are numerous, but a brief examination 
of two will be sufficient to demonstrate the foundations upon which 
they are built. The most prominent of these doctrines is that of deny-
ing assignee-for-value or holder-in-due-course status to a financing 
institution that is too closely connected with the seller's business 
operations or with the particular sale at issue.85 A consumer advocate 
30. This doctrine assumes a waiver of such defenses by the consumer in favor of 
any assignee, a common feature in a sales contract involving consumer credit. St!e 
Navin, Waivf!r of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 48 N.C. L. REv. 505, 508 
(1970). 
31. ucc § 3-305. 
32. See generally B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEcISLATION 312-22 (1965). 
33. See Navin, supra note 30; Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Dt!fenses: Plugging 
the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L REv. 272 (1969). 
34. See generally Bergsten, supra note 12, at 509-13; Comment, supra note 7, at 459. 
35. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. IOI, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Commercial Credit Corp. 
v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Commercial 
Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W .2d 260 (1940). 
The principle to be gleaned from the "close connection" cases seems to be 
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would point to many indicia of a close business relationship between 
a bank and a merchant participating in a charge card program. The 
bank typically maintains a demand deposit account on behalf of the 
merchant and provides the merchant with machine processable sales 
slips of uniform size and content, advertising and other promotional 
material for the charge card program, an imprinter, and applications 
that customers can use to obtain charge cards. The bank regularly 
accepts for deposit sales slips generated in charge card transactions. 
In the case of many merchants, particularly small businessmen, it 
can be argued that no credit sales whatsoever would have been made 
in the absence of the bank charge card service because the small busi-
nessman simply would have insufficient resources to operate a credit 
plan. 
A related theory that is used to deny the status of an assignee 
for value or a holder in due course in consumer credit cases is that of 
knowledge, on the part of the assignee or holder, of the defect in the 
underlying sales transaction that gives rise to the consumer defense.36 
Both a theory based on knowledge and a theory based on close con-
nection accomplish the same purpose, but the burden of proof to be 
borne by the consumer is substantially less if a close-connection doc-
trine is accepted. All that need be proved in the latter instance is 
the business relationship; the subjection of the holder to consumer 
defenses follows as a direct consequence. The consumer advo-
cate would argue that a cardholder who can show that the bank had 
knowledge of the defect in his transaction that gives rise to a defense 
should, consistent with the assignment theory, be able to assert that 
defense against the bank. Realistically, the number of cases in which 
a consumer can make such a showing will probably be small since a 
theory based on knowledge may require that the consumer prove that 
the relationship between the bank and the merchant resulted in 
actual knowledge of the facts constituting the consumer defense. In 
that regard a battle has been fought for some time on the issue 
whether the proper test for such knowledge is an objective or sub-
that a financer will not be subject to defenses unless he is involved to a significant 
degree in controlling the sales transaction itself or has some unusual contact with the 
merchant or the sales transaction. See generally Littlefield, supra note 33, at 275-77; 
Comment, Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder in Due 
Course" in Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. R.Ev. 90, 99 (1969). This 
concept forms the theoretical basis for § 2.407 of the NCA, entitled "Interlocking 
Loans and Sales," which subjects creditors to claims and defenses of the consumer if 
the creditor "participated in or was connected with" the sale. 
36. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the 
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966). 
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jective one.s1 The resolution of this question is important since the 
application of one test or the other would frequently mean a differ-
ence between success and failure for the consumer's cause.ss 
In at least one instance known to the authors, consumer advocates 
have argued that banks should be subject to liability for merchants' 
wrongs under a negligence theory.so Such a theory proceeds from the 
premise that the merchant would not have been able to enter into 
the consumer transaction at issue absent the culpability of the bank 
in allowing his participation in a charge card plan; that it is the duty 
of the bank to investigate a merchant to insure that he is not engag-
ing in questionable practices before allowing him to participate; and 
that if no investigation is conducted or if it is conducted negligently, 
the bank should be responsible to the consumer for the ensuing loss. 
Lender liability under arguably comparable circumstances is not un-
known. The California supreme court, for instance, has held that a 
savings and loan association that provided financing to a contractor 
for the construction of residential housing could be held liable to 
home purchasers for defective construction.40 
A variation of the negligence theory would find a duty to allow 
the easily identifiable service marks associated with major charge 
card plans to be displayed only by merchants that have been thor-
oughly investigated. It has been argued that the display of the service 
mark places the bank in the position of an endorser. Such was found 
to be the case when it was held that the owners of the Good House-
keeping Seal could be liable to a consumer who had suffered injury 
while using a product under circumstances where the Seal appeared 
on the product or in advertising for the product.41 
This Article will not attempt to deal with a negligence theory, 
however, since the theory deviates significantly in its theoretical basis, 
in the remedy proposed, and in its potential for acceptance from 
those theories reiating to the denial of the status of an assignee for 
value or holder in due course.42 A negligence theory would not oper-
37. See cases cited in Littlefield, supra note 36. 
38. See Littlefield, supra note 36. 
39. Brief for Appellants, supra note 27, at 32-40. 
40. Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). The Connor doctrine received an inhospitable reception in Cali-
fornia. The legislature subsequently limited the doctrine, CAL. Cxv. ConE § 3434 (West 
Supp. 1970), and even the judiciary itself seemed to retrench as minor factual distinc-
tions from the facts present in Connor were seized upon to reject the applicability of 
the Connor analysis. See Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969). 
41. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969). See 
also Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971). 
42. See generally Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural 
Defects in New Housing, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 739, 750, 755 (1968). 
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ate merely to prevent the cutting off of consumer defenses. Rather 
than providing a shield from the bank's attempts to collect money 
due resulting from an ability to assert defenses to collection, a negli-
gence theory would operate as a sword by which persons might hold 
banks liable for personal injury or property damage caused by defec-
tive products. Furthermore, given the nature of multiparty charge 
card interchange systems, a negligence rule would work a curious 
result. It would not allow the consumer to assert defenses against 
the bank seeking to collect on the underlying obligation. The bank 
that would bear the duty arising from a negligence theory of liability 
would be the depositary bank, which usually would not be the insti-
tution seeking to collect amounts due. Hence, such a theory repre-
sents a separate and distinct development in consumer law outside 
the scope of this discussion. 
V. THE CREDITOR'S POSITION 
While a consumer advocate views a bank charge card transaction 
as different from a direct extension of credit by a merchant in form 
only and would advocate a complete disregard of that difference, a 
creditor advocate43 would hasten to point out that more than dif-
ferences in form are at issue. He would note that significant differ-
ences exist in the relationships and expectations of the parties to a 
multiparty charge card transaction in contrast to typical direct credit 
extensions by a merchant in which the obligation is later assigned 
or negotiated to third parties. 
While the consumer's position rests on the assignment theory 
discussed above, 44 the creditor advocate would maintain that the 
assignment theory is simply not applicable to bank charge card 
plans.45 As described above,46 no obligation is created on the part of 
the cardholder to pay the merchant in a charge card transaction. The 
cardholder's obligation to pay for the goods or services purchased 
arises solely out of the cardholder agreement and accrues solely to 
43. The term "creditor advocate," like "consumer advocate" (see note 28 supra) 
will be given an expanded definition in this Article to include those persons who have 
presented the creditor's position in law reviews as well as in the courts and legislatures. 
44. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
45. This is not to say that the assignment theory is never used. Because local laws 
in some jurisdictions would not permit, as a practical matter, structuring of bank 
charge card transactions as direct obligations to the issuer, banks have been forced 
under some circumstances to adopt unwieldy procedures under which they are assigned 
"sales contracts." Such a situation existed in Utah, for example, where banks operated 
charge card programs under the state's revolving charge agreement provisions until 
Utah enacted the UCCC in 1969. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-l-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1969). 
46. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
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the issuer. Hence, the merchant has no obligation to assign.47 The 
merchant does not evaluate the credit risk involved, assumes no 
credit risk, and sets no terms upon which credit is granted. To the 
contrary, he typically has knowledge of none of the terms of the 
agreement between his customer and the issuer, such as the terms of 
repayment, length of the free period, deferred-payment schedule, 
and finance charges. These terms are set forth solely in the agreement 
between the cardholder and the issuer. The merchant's relationship 
to the customer is only that of a seller of goods and services, and his 
responsibility relates only to the quantity and quality of those goods 
and services. 
It is the issuer, frequently thousands of miles distant from the 
transaction, that sets the terms upon which credit may be obtained, 
that conducts an initial evaluation of the charge card applicant to 
determine whether to issue a card, and that conducts an on-going 
review of the account status. It is the issuer, not the merchant, that 
assumes the business risks associated with the extension of credit. 
A "direct obligation" theory,48 then, the creditor advocate 
would urge, best describes the nature of a multiparty charge card 
transaction since it recognizes that the cardholder's obligation that 
is created on the making of a purchase is one owed "directly" to the 
issuer of the card in accordance with the terms of the cardholder 
agreement. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, for instance, im-
plicitly adopts this theory by placing bank charge card transactions 
in the category of direct loans by financial institutions to consumers.411 
Consistent with the direct-obligation theory is the creditor advo-
cate's analogy of charge card transactions to letter-of-credit trans-
actions, which are governed by article 5 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.rm The multiparty bank charge card transaction appears to be a 
47. Comment, supra note 7, at 499. This assumes a charge card plan that is not 
specifically structured to accord with an assignment theory. 
48. See generally Bergsten, supra note 12, at 509-1!1; Comment, supra note 7, at 459. 
49. UCCC §§ 1.301(9), 3.106(3). The Federal Reserve :Board came to much the same 
conclusion in characterizing only the bank, not the merchant, as a creditor in a bank 
charge card transaction. The merchant is not even viewed as an arranger of credit, 
much less a creditor, by federal truth-in-lending regnlations. Fed. Reserve Bd. Reg. 
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(£) (1970). Section 2.407 of the NCA, while reaching a different 
result than the UCCC, does not appear to dispute this basic premise. It simply in-
cludes some direct-loan transactions in the category of credit sales in which the 
consumer will have a right to assert product related defenses against a creditor. See 
note 2 supra. 
50. See generally Davenport, supra note 11, at 963; Comment, supra note 7, at 472; 
Comment, The Applicability of the Law of Letters of Credit to Modem Bank Card 
Systems, 18 KAN. L. REv. 871 (1970) [hereinafter Comment, Letters of Credit]. 
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hybrid of the traveler's or "clean" letter of credit and the commer-
cial or documentary letter of credit, although it more closely resem-
bles the latter.151 
A commercial letter-of-credit transaction typically involves three 
parties: issuer, customer-buyer, and seller-beneficiary.152 The rights 
and obligations of these parties are defined by three separate and 
independent agreements between buyer and seller, buyer and issuer, 
and issuer and seller.153 Under the terms of a letter of credit, the issuer 
engages that it will accept the seller's drafts drawn on the issuer, con-
ditioned upon the seller's tender of document specified by the buyer. 
The buyer agrees to reimburse the issuer for the amounts of the 
drafts so presented. 
In relying on the letter of credit, the seller-beneficiary looks to 
the credit of the issuer instead of that of the unknown buyer and 
typically has no knowledge of the terms of the reimbursement agree-
ment between the buyer and the issuer. In accepting the seller's 
draft, the issuer must insist on the specified documentation, but it 
is not required to concern itself with the underlying sales transaction. 
Once the issuer has accepted the draft, the buyer is obligated directly 
to the issuer to pay the amount of the draft, regardless of how the 
contract of sale is performed by the seller.54 Even when only one 
bank, having contact with both the seller and buyer, is involved in 
51. The cash advance feature of bank charge card plans, whereby cash may be 
obtained directly at the offices of member banks upon presentation of the charge card, 
performs the identical function of the traveler's letter of credit. Davenport, supra 
note 11, at 964-65. 
52. A letter-of-credit transaction may also involve a fourth party, the confirming 
bank, which is located in the area in which the seller-beneficiary is domiciled. The 
confirming bank is instructed by the issuer to hold itself out to the seller as being 
responsible for the seller's drafts drawn in accordance with the credit. See W. WARD 
8: H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 25-26 (4th ed. 1958). In this respect, 
the confirming bank performs the function of the depositary bank in charge card 
transactions. 
53. See generally W. WARD 8: H. HARFIELD, supra note 52, at 21-35; H. FINKEISrEIN, 
LEGAL AsPEcrs OF COMMERCIAL I.EITERS OF CREDIT (1930); Davenport, supra note 11, 
at 963-77; Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50, at 875-77. 
54. UCC § 5-114(1) provides: "An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment 
which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods 
or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between 
the customer and the beneficiary •••• " UCC § 5-109(1) states: 
An issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance of any 
general banking usage but unless otherwise agreed does not include liability or 
responsibility 
(a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction 
between the customer and the beneficiary; or 
(b) for any act or omission of any person other than itself or its own branch 
See also W. WARD 8: H. HAilFn:LD, supra note 52, at 47-48. 
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the letter-of-credit transaction, letter-of-credit law has long recognized 
that it would be impracticable to embroil the issuer in buyer-seller 
disputes.55 
The similarities between bank charge cards and letters of credit 
are striking, 56 and creditor advocates have resorted to this analogy. 
The cardholder agreement performs the function of the customer-
issuer agreement and requires the cardholder to reimburse the issuer 
for sales slips honored, provided certain conditions are met. The 
letter of credit itself is the agreement between issuer and beneficiary, 
and the combination of the charge card and the merchant agreement 
serves the same purpose in setting forth the terms under which sales 
slips will be accepted.57 The sales slip would seem to satisfy the defi-
nition of "a documentary draft or documentary demand for pay-
ment" in article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code.58 
Not only is the nature of the various obligations of the parties in 
a letter-of-credit transaction strikingly similar to that in the bank 
charge card transaction, the purpose for which both modes of pay-
ment were created-substitution of the promise to pay of a recog-
nized financial institution for that of the unknown customer-is 
precisely the same. Creditor advocates would argue that minor dif-
ferences in these two methods of payment should not be allowed to 
obscure their important similarity: in both, the cardholder-custom-
55. H. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 53, at 223-49; w. WARD &: H. HARFIELD, supra note 
52, at 50-52. See Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 
636 (1925); Laudisi v. American Exch. Natl. Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924). 
But see Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 
(Sup. Ct. 1941). 
56. Davenport, supra note 11, at 967; Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50, 
at 875-79. Section 1.301(9) of the UCCC recognizes this similarity by providing: 
"'Lender credit card or similar arrangement' means an arrangement or loan agree-
ment ••• pursuant to which a lender gives a debtor the privilege of using a credit 
card, letter of credit, or other credit confirmation •••• " (emphasis added). 
57. See Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50, at 877. 
58. UCC § 5-102(1) provides: 
This Article applies 
(a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit requires a documentary draft or 
a documentary demand for payment; and 
(b) to a credit issued by a person other than a bank if the credit requires that 
the draft or demand for payment be accompanied by a document of title; 
and 
(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the credit is not within 
subparagra:phs (a) or (b) but conspicuously states that it is a letter of credit 
or 1s conspicuously so entitled. 
UCC § 5-103(b) provides: 
A "documentary draft" or a "documentary demand for payment" is one honor of 
whiclI is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents. "Docu-
ment" means any paper including document of title, security, invoice, certificate, 
notice of default and the like. 
See Comment, Letters of Credit, supra note 50, at 882-83. 
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er's obligation flows directly to the issuer and is independent of the 
underlying sales transaction.59 
The principles developed in letter-of-credit transactions through-
out the years confirm that notice of infirmities in the underlying sale 
transaction, whether they be questions of breach of warranty or fraud 
in the inducement, should not affect the customer's obligation to its 
issuer.00 To hold otherwise would require banks to become experts in 
the quality and custom of hundreds of thousands of types of goods that 
are purchased with letters of credit, or bank charge cards, and to 
become involved in as many disputes. The issuer would be required, 
upon receipt of notice from its customer of an alleged defense, to act 
as an arbitrator in any dispute between customer and merchant-an 
onerous and expensive duty. It is a fundamental premise of such 
transactions that the bank ought not to concern itself with the qual-
ity of merchandise or standards of performance, but only with the 
financial aspects of the transaction as they appear from documenta-
tion. 61 
Another analogy consistent with the direct-obligation theory to 
which creditor advocates resort is that of the personal check. In 
many respects charge card systems are functionally related to the 
check system. Under a bank charge card system the depositary bank 
furnishes the merchant with deposit forms and sales slips, documents 
upon which the fund transfer is recorded. The same bank furnishes 
the merchant with deposit forms and its customers with checks, 
which also serve to record the fund transfer when payment is made 
by check. The merchant itemizes charge card transaction sales slips 
on a deposit form and deposits them at his depositary bank where 
the amounts are credited to his checking account. He also itemizes 
checks on a deposit slip and deposits them with the same bank, 
which credits the amounts to the same account. The depositary bank 
forwards the sales slips through the charge card clearing system and 
is reimbursed by the issuer. Similarly, the merchant's depositary 
bank forwards checks through the check clearing system to the 
payor-drawee bank, which reimburses the depositary bank. The is-
suer receives sales slips chargeable to its cardholder's charge card, 
59. Commentators have recognized the significance of the cardholder's direct promise 
to pay the issuer, irrespective of claims or defenses against the merchant: "It thus 
appears that the bank has an absolute right to receive payment from the cardholder 
for all purchases made with the card." Comment, Bank Credit Plans, supra note 26, 
at 60. See Davenport, supra note 11, at 974-75. 
60. See note 55 supra. 
61. Laudisi v. American Exch. Natl. Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N~. 347 (1924). 
This principle has been codified in UCC § 5-114(2). 
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and if such slips are properly completed, charges the amount thereof 
to the cardholder's account. The drawee bank receives checks drawn 
on its customer's account, and if properly drawn, the amounts are 
charged to the drawer-customer's account in accordance with the 
drawer-drawee agreement. 
The relationship between the drawee bank and the customer 
may also involve an extension of credit if, for example, the drawee 
bank makes available a "check reserve" or "check credit" plan to 
its customers. Under such plans, the drawee extends a line of credit 
to the customer against which the customer may draw by writing 
checks that would otherwise overdraw his checking account.62 In 
many of these plans ordinary checks are used. The customer repays 
amounts in excess of those on deposit according to the check re-
serve agreement in the same manner that a cardholder would pay 
the issuer in a charge card plan; the customer has the option of 
repaying the total amount when billed or making payments accord-
ing to a deferred-payment schedule.63 
When a check reserve plan is involved, the check system of pay-
ment is difficult to distinguish functionally from the charge card 
system. The merchant views both systems as simply a form of pay-
ment and is not concerned with the particular arrangement between 
his customer and the issuer or drawee bank. When a check is pre-
sented, the merchant has no way of knowing whether the customer 
has funds in his account against which the check will be charged, 
or whether the check will create an overdraft that will actuate a 
"loan" by the drawee to the customer pursuant to a check reserve 
plan. Moreover, if such a loan is made, the merchant will have no 
knowledge of the terms of repayment under the check reserve plan. 
Precisely the same situation exists in a charge card transaction-the 
merchant does not know whether a deferred payment will be elected 
by the cardholder on billing or not. 
The idea that banks that process checks should be held liable 
for events occuring in an underlying purchase of goods or services 
would seem ludicrous, even if a loan under a check reserve plan 
were part of the transaction, but that is because checks have been 
accepted for many years as a form of payment and are subject to 
well-developed rules of law. The principles applicable to checks 
62. Even absent the formal creation of such a credit arrangement, an ordinary check-
ing account may involve the extension of credit. If a check creates an overdraft in a 
customer's account, the bank has the option of dishonoring it and returning it to the 
depositary bank, or of charging the amount against its customer's account and recover-
ing from the customer. UCC § 4-401(1). 
63. See generally Fm. R.EsERvE SYs., REP., supra note 7, at 22-23. 
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were developed with a view toward providing a convenient, safe 
form of payment beneficial to a wide range of users. Charge cards 
are now supplanting checks as a form of payment. Creditor advo-
cates feel that the similarities in function between check and charge 
card systems argue for a similarity in the legal obligations and rights 
of the parties involved. 
Further, the coming of the checkless and cashless society will in-
volve a shift from the check or document system to an electronic-
transfer system. It has been envisaged that in such a system the 
customer will transmit directly to the payor bank or issuer an order 
that a specified amount be transferred from the customer's account 
to the account of the merchant from whom the customer is purchas-
ing goods or services. The "order" will be transmitted via electronic 
impulse initiated at a terminal in the merchant's establishment. The 
merchant will be paid at the instant of the cardholder's order trans-
mittal by means of a credit to his account; the cardholder's account 
will be debited at the same time.64 
The concept of a direct order by the cardholder to the issuer 
through the use of a combination of the charge card and electronic 
terminal emphasizes the fact that documentation at the merchant 
level can easily be by-passed in the charge card system. An assignment 
theory becomes even more patently inapplicable to the charge card 
system when direct electronic transfers are used since then there will 
be no document for the merchant to negotiate or assign. The trans-
fers from one account to the other will be the direct consequence of 
an order by the cardholder to the issuer, with the merchant inter-
ested only in the ultimate result.65 
The functional concept of the direct electronic transmission of 
an order from cardholder to issuer and the legal concept of a direct 
obligation flowing from cardholder to issuer are mutually rein-
forcing. The direct-obligation theory seems not only to provide 
the legal framework most descriptive of charge card transactions as 
they are now taking place, but it also seems to hold the most promise 
for providing a realistic legal framework within which the commer-
64. The terminal could be actuated by a charge card, and it has been suggested 
that, eventually, the input to the issuer may be initiated merely by the customer's voice. 
See generally Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 YALE L.J. 788, 793 (1966). 
65. A variation of such a paperless transaction is that contemplated by the SCOPE 
report, note 13 supra. Under such a plan merchants, such as utilities, would be pre-
authorized by a consumer regularly to charge against the consumer's checking account. 
As pointed out above, such a transaction could easily result in an extension of credit, 
without the knowledge of the merchant, and, perhaps, without knowledge of the 
consumer. 
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cial-payment mechanism can undergo a smooth transition from a 
document system to an electronic-transfer system. 
Not only does the direct-obligation theory espoused by creditor 
advocates call for banks to be free from involvement with the under-
lying sales transaction, practical considerations peculiar to multi-
party charge card transactions dictate that same result. As was indi-
cated earlier,66 the roles of issuer and depositary bank are usually 
occupied by different banks. In a high percentage of charge card 
transactions, the banks may not be located in the same geographic 
part of the United States;67 in a not insignificant number of trans-
actions they may even be located in different countries. 68 The issuer 
-the party against which defenses would be asserted-typically will 
have no knowledge of and no contact with the merchant honoring 
the charge card and, therefore, will have no way of evaluating that 
merchant's performance or his financial status or anything else 
about him. Hence, even if the premise of the assignment theory 
were accepted arguendo, arguments concerning the quantity or 
quality of knowledge or contact under the close-connection and 
knowledge theories articulated above become tenuous at best in most 
transactions. 
Nor would an issuer, thousands of miles removed from the mer-
chant, have the ability to gather such information if a duty to 
evaluate merchants were imposed. Businesses accepting multiparty 
charge cards deal in literally millions of products and services and 
utilize widely varying sales techniques. Businessmen honoring such 
cards are dispersed nationally and internationally in jurisdictions 
having different business and legal standards. There is no existing 
institution inside or outside the banking community that is in a 
position to make nation- or world-wide investigations and qualita-
tive determinations regarding each and every product, service, and 
business practice that is or may be defective or abusive. To require 
a subjective evaluation of business practices and products on such 
a grand scale and with a view to varying standards, a task no agency 
has ever accomplished or could possibly hope to accomplish, would 
be to impose an impossible duty on banks issuing charge cards. 
66. See text accompanying notes 7 &: 9 supra. 
67. Western States Bankcard Association, a regional interchange association for the 
Master Charge system in seven western states, indicates that twenty-five per cent of all 
items processed involve an issuer or depositary bank that is not located in the western 
region of the United States. This does not take into account items upon which appear, 
for example, an issuer located in Los Angeles and a depositary bank located in San 
Francisco. Western States Bankcard Association, Significant Statistics Report, on file in 
the offices of the Michigan Law Review. 
68. See San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1971, at 59, col. 5. 
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Furthermore, even if an issuer had reason to believe that a par-
ticular merchant had engaged in unsavory practices or sold goods 
or services that were not of high quality, it would have no way of 
preventing that merchant from accepting its charge cards. In order 
to protect itself, an issuer would have to join with the depositary 
hank that enabled the merchant to accept slips, and all other banks 
that might potentially enter into such a relationship with the mer-
chant, to refuse jointly to deal with the merchant. Such conduct-a 
concerted refusal to deal-would likely be a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act.69 The fact that such concerted action may have been 
taken to protect consumers has been held to provide no defense 
under the antitrust laws.70 
Even depositary banks know little of the business practices or 
the quality of the merchandise sold by the tens of thousands of 
merchants with which they enter into depositary arrangements. The 
insignificance of any individual merchant's activities in relation to 
the total anticipated profit from all charge card transactions would 
not warrant a continuing investigation of the merchant as a matter 
of course. Merchants offer an almost infinite variety of goods and 
services. A bank cannot develop an expertise in all such areas and 
it would thus be unrealistic to expect a bank to monitor the prac-
tices of the merchants that accept bank charge cards. It would be 
as unfair and unrealistic to expect a depositary bank to make such 
an investigation of a merchant who had an agreement enabling him 
to accept charge cards as it would be of a merchant who maintained 
nothing more than an ordinary checking account with the bank. 
Creditor advocates also note another practical problem if de-
fenses were assertable against issuers. A cardholder-obligor could 
simply make allegations of dissatisfaction with the goods or services 
he received, whether or not the allegations were well founded, and 
refuse to pay debts he incurred directly to the issuer. The issuer 
might be located thousands of miles from the scene where the pur-
chase took place. It would not be familiar with the substance of the 
transaction, nor with the local laws or business practices that control 
the transaction. To conduct an investigation to determine the facts 
would be prohibitively expensive.71 To avoid being placed in an 
untenable position, the issuer might insist in advance upon an ar-
69. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959). 
70. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas, Light &: Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 656-68 
(1961); Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See 
Orrick, Trade Associations Are Boycott Prone-Bid Depositories as a Case Study, 19 
liAsnNGs L.J. 505, 516-18 (1968); N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1969, at 57, col. 6. 
71. See Bergsten, supra note 12, at 515-17. 
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rangement whereby it could charge back through the various clearing 
steps to the depositary bank any sales slips over which a dispute 
arose. The depositary bank would presumably then charge back such 
a sales slip to the merchant from which it originated. As a practical 
matter, every sales slip upon which an obligor chose not to make 
payment would then be charged back so long as he made representa-
tions that on their face would constitute a defense to an action to 
collect the amounts owed. 
Such a system would shatter the legitimate expectations of mer-
chants. If the sales slip were charged back to him, the merchant 
would have nothing except a sales slip. The consumer would have 
the merchandise involved in the transaction and an asserted defense 
of unknown validity to the obligation to pay for the merchandise. 
Merchants should not be left in such a position with little effective 
recourse. 
The merchant could not rely on the banks as an intermediary 
under such a charge-back rule. Unlike the situation in which a 
single financing institution is involved in the transaction, the issuer 
in a multiparty charge card transaction has no incentive to become 
involved in a cardholder-merchant dispute if it may rid itself of 
the troublesome sales slip by charging it back.72 If a single financial 
institution is involved, it must be sensitive to the claims of both its 
merchant and its debtor, since it desires a continuing relationship 
with both. The bank in such a case is likely to promote an accommo-
dation between the parties. This is not the case for the New York 
issuer whose cardholder refuses to pay for merchandise purchased 
from a California merchant. His goals are cardholder satisfaction 
and minimal costs, both of which can be achieved by charging back 
immediately at the first sign of a refusal to pay, without bothering to 
examine the merits of the dispute. 
Given the merchant's vulnerability to any alleged dispute, credi-
tor advocates could point to the potential for unfairness if defenses 
were assertable in all transactions. Consumer advocates focus on 
the harm caused by the unscrupulous merchant, but no less harm 
may befall the innocent merchant who becomes the victim of the 
unscrupulous consumer who learns that payments for purchases can 
be ignored once he raises an alleged defense and refuses to pay his 
issuer. Even assuming a good faith, but erroneous, dispute, the 
merchant is left with lost merchandise and little recourse. In most 
72. Curiously, if defenses are not assertable against an issuer as a matter of right, 
and if no charge-back right exists, a bank will have an interest in maintaining card-
holder satisfaction and may very well assist the cardholder in reaching some accom-
modation. 
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situations, a merchant does not choose his customers; the customers 
choose his establishment. A consumer has the opportunity to do 
business or not to do business with a merchant, as he sees fit. If 
proper payment is tendered, which includes, of course, the use of a 
charge card, a merchant does not have such an opportunity; he must 
do business with the consumer. The merchant relies on the promise 
of the bank to pay, not that of the cardholder. Creditor advocates 
maintain that to destroy that reliance-the basis upon which charge 
cards are accepted-by a rule that would result in a charge back 
of the transaction by the bank, which charge back could, as a practi-
cal matter, take place at the whim of the cardholder, could greatly 
diminish the utility of the bank charge card and its acceptance as a 
medium of exchange. 
VI. A NEW PROPOSAL 
So much for the arguments now being advocated. The consumer 
advocate's argument is attractive as a way to improve the lot of 
the individual consumer, but it ignores significant facts in its anal-
ogies and conclusions. Moreover, the social consequences may ac-
tually be adverse to consumers as a class as well as to others. The 
creditor advocate's argument is difficult to rebut for its technical 
validity, but it fails to take into account new perceptions concerning 
the relationship of consumers to those who provide them with goods 
and services. Intense pressure is being brought to bear by consumer 
advocates on courts and legislatures to extend additional protection 
to consumers. A recent bill proposed by Senator Proxmire, for in-
stance, would allow cardholders to assert defenses against issuers in 
all transactions.73 The issue is waiting to be resolved. A preliminary 
73. Section 169 of the proposed Fair Credit Billing Act represents an interesting 
study in the development of legal principles in this area. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 169 (1971). That section represents a new incursion into an area of the law pre-
viously left to the states. Senator Proxmire appears to be concerned about the effect 
on consumer rights of introducing a third party financer into consumer credit trans-
actions, but he reaches a form of consumer credit that accounts for less than ten per 
cent of the total. 57 FEDERAL REsERVE BuLL. A54-55 (1971); Hearings pursuant to H.R. 
Res. 66 Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the Select Comm. 
on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1970). 
Thirty jurisdictions have made some inroads against financer insulation from de-
fenses. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.10.140 (1962), § 45.50.541 (Supp. 1970); ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. 
ANN. § 44-290 (1956), § 44-5005 (Supp. 1970); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1804.1-.2, 2983.5, .7 
(West Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. § 42-136 (Supp. 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§§ 4302, 4311-12, 4342 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 520.74, .80, .88 (Supp. 1971); 
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. §§ 476-18, -36 (1968); ch. 299, § 2.404, [1971] Idaho Acts; ILL. STAT. 
ANN. ch. 121-½, §§ 262D, 517-18, 576-77 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 16-507 (Supp. 1970); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3481, 3724 (Supp. 1970); MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 147, 153D(f) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, § 12c (1968), 
ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1970), ch. 255B, § 20 (Supp. 1970), ch. 255D, § 25A (Supp. 1970); 
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step in the resolution process must be to identify the forum most 
able to fashion a workable rule on the issue. 
A. The Problem Is Not Susceptible of Judicial Solution 
The judicial system is not in a position to articulate a rule on 
the issue of the assertability of consumer defenses that will serve 
well the parties to bank charge card transactions. Courts must face 
such issues in the context of a particular fact situation as cases come 
before them. They are not given the opportunity adequately to con-
sider the generalized experience in such transactions. The consumer 
advocate will, of course, choose as a case to advance his theory one 
that will have facts most appealing to a court. That case, however, 
may reflect a situation that is statistically insignificant and result in 
a rule adequate for that case but inadequate to govern the vast 
majority of cases. 
In addition to being forced to consider issues of general applica-
bility in the context of possibly unique factual constraints, the 
judicial process does not lend itself to a full development and ex-
posure of data necessary to analyze the ramifications of such a prob-
lem. A legislature may wish to determine whether any harm is 
actually suffered by consumers as a class under the current law. It 
may also wish to inquire whether a charge card program is profit-
able to banks, for if it were shown that it is not, or that it is 
only marginally profitable, the legislature may not wish to impose 
further liabilities that could extinguish the infant consumer service.74 
Information should also be gathered on the present practices of 
banks in evaluating and monitoring a merchant's practices and 
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.864-.865, 455.1206-.1208, 492.114 (1967); MISs. CoDE 
ANN. § 8075-13 (Supp. 1970); Mo. REv. STAT. § 408.260 (1969); NEV. REv. STAT. § 97.275 
(Supp. 1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 361-A:7 (VIII) (1966), §§ 320:21-a, :21-b (Supp. 
1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-38, •64 to -64.3 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-15-7(1) 
(1962), § 50-16-5 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw §§ 302.9, .12, 403 (McKinney Supp. 
1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-13-02(18) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 2•403, -404 
(Supp. 1970); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 83.150, .650, .670(5) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, 
§ 615(F)-(G) (1965), tit. 69, §§ 1401-02 (Supp. 1971), tit. 69, § 1909 (Supp. 1971), tit. 
73, §§ 500-206 to -208 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6-28•6 (1969), § 6-27-5 
(Supp. 1970); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, §§ 6.05, .o7, 7.07-.08 (1971); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 70B-2-403, -404 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2355(1), 2405(0), 
2455 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.14.020, .150, .154 (Supp. 1970). 
Full coverage of the ordinary credit sale involving an assignment would be the 
next logical development, but § 169 ignores that issue and protects consumer defenses 
in only multiparty transactions, perhaps the most difficult rule to justify. The legisla-
tive proposal may be explainable, however, as supplemental to a proposed FTC rule 
on consumer defenses (see notes 4 supra and 85 infra). 
74. See Bunting Says Profit Lag in Bank Cards Nears Crisis Stage, AMERICAN BANKER, 
April 7, 1971, at 1, col. l; 1970 Losses for Bank Cards Top $115.5 Mil., Over 50% 
Higher Than '69, AMERICAN BANK.ER, March 29, 1971, at 1, col. 1. 
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financial status, and on the practicalities of placing more onerous bur-
dens on banks. 
In weighing the relevant factors, the decisionmaker would have 
to place on either side of the scales the social benefits and social 
detriments to be derived from the present state of the law and 
compare them to those resulting if the state of law were altered as 
urged. A careful quantification is essential so that undue emphasis 
is not placed on factors present in a given case that may be unique 
or statistically insignificant in the universe of transactions that the 
proposed rule would govern. Such a quantification assumes the 
collection of massive data. Legislatures are clearly better equipped to 
undertake the necessary data-gathering effort than are courts, which 
must, in general, rely on data presented by the parties.75 
In addition, the nature of the judicial process makes it difficult 
for a court to articulate a rule than can have the hard, precise 
delimitations of statutory language. A legislature might choose to 
extend liability concepts only under restricted circumstances, such 
as will be suggested below, or it might choose to provide consumer 
protection by attacking the complained-of transaction directly.76 A 
court does not have such a capability. 
The role of the judiciary with regard to consumer protection 
has changed in the last decade. In the past, courts were justly con-
cerned that consumers could not look to their legislators to protect 
75. Congress has taken an initial step to accumulate such data. It is the under-
standing of the authors that the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs has circulated a questionnaire to 
the bank charge card industry, requesting information relative to billing practices of 
issuers. 
The National Commission on Consumer Finance, established by § 401 of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 164 (1968), in its REPORT ON CURRENT STUDY 
PROJEcrs, released on March 18, 1971, noted that 
Since much of the information needed for its studies has been unavailable or in 
unusable form, the Commission has launched several data collection projects of 
its own •••• Traditionally, consumer credit legislation has focused on a specific 
problem with the idea of correction, modification, or outright change. Legislation 
has often been proposed on the basis of assumptions despite the fact that few if 
any facts are available on the potential effects of proposals. But this Commission, 
from the data it gathers, will try to assess the many variables that affect any 
changes in the " .•• functioning and structure of the consumer finance industry." 
Such assessments should provide a basis for legislative bodies, both state and na-
tional, to predict with better accuracy the effect on credit grantors and users of 
proposed laws and regulations relating to consumer credit. 
NATIONAL Coll!MISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, REPORT ON CURRENT STUDY PROJECIS 1-2 
(1971), on file in the offices of the Michigan Law Review. 
76. Sales made by door-to-door sslesmen frequently result in consumer complaints, 
for instance. Some legislatures have provided for special relief in such sales. See, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5005 (Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-136 (Supp. 
1970): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 320:21-a, 21-b (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.§ 6-28-6 
(1969); WASH. REV. CooE § 63.14.154 (Supp. 1970). See generally l CCH CoNSUMER 
CREDIT GUIDE 11 4690 (1971). 
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them and they took it upon themselves to adopt new theories to 
provide consumer protection in the absence of legislative concern. 
On the other hand, one need only cite to the various state retail 
installment sales acts,77 the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act,78 Fair 
Credit Reporting Act,79 the proposed Fair Credit Billing Act,80 the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code,81 and the myriad of congressional 
hearings and pending bills that deal with the subject of consumer 
protection82 to demonstrate that consumers are extremely well repre-
sented today in the halls of Congress, in state legislatures, and before 
governmental agencies.83 Senator Magnuson has stated, "The sixties 
have rightly been called the Decade of the Consumer."84 The seven-
ties promise to see an acceleration of that decade's concern for the 
well-being of the consumer. It_ is evident that the consumer can expect 
continuing protection through the legislative process, which will 
provide a thorough and careful analysis of all aspects of the particular 
transaction at issue, to the benefit of consumers and commerce alike. 
Thus, the necessity for a court to formulate a new rule based on 
inadequate data no longer exists.85 
It seems clear that a legislative solution is indicated. A legislature 
would best proceed by making a careful analysis of the unique facts 
involved in the operations of bank charge card systems and by de-
vising a unique solution to take those facts into account. It should 
not proceed by borrowing concepts designed to deal with dissimilar 
transactions. 
Furthermore, the rule that governs this issue should be uniform 
in all jurisdictions, if possible. If the law varies from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, the task of accommodating the rights of the various 
parties involved will be difficult as members of America's mobile 
society engage in an increasingly large volume of interstate and inter-
77. See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 32. 
78. U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
79. P.L. No. 91-508, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
80. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
81. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (1969); UTAH CoDE .ANN, 
§§ 70B-l-101 to 70B-9-103 (Supp. 1969). 
82. See, e.g., 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, REP. No. 62, at 12, REP. No. 61, at 10, 
REP. No. 60, at 5 (1971). 
83. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE PROTECTlON 11-12, 86-87, 189 
(1970). 
84. Id. at 189. 
85. While this Article was being prepared, Congress and the Federal Trade Com-
mission introduced measures dealing directly with this problem. S. 652, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1971): Proposed FTC Reg. § 433.1, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971). Furthermore, it 
is the understanding of the authors that several state legislatures in addition to New 
York will be considering the issue this year. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
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national charge card transactions. Hence, federal legislation that 
should pre-empt local law would appear to be the best solution, so 
that the parties would be subject to a uniform rule no matter in 
what state a party was located or a portion of the transaction took 
place. It could not solve the problems caused by use of charge cards 
internationally, but it would be a far better alternative than a 
myriad assortment of statutes passed by individual states.86 
B. A Monetary Limit 
Certain key features of bank charge card transactions must be 
given due weight in any statute that attempts to deal with the prob-
lem of the assertability of consumer defenses in this setting. The 
title of this Article, "New Cash or New Credit," highlights an issue 
to which few persons have addressed themselves in the context of 
arguing the viability of the insulation of creditors from consumer 
defenses as that doctrine pertains to bank charge cards. The issue is 
a vitally important one because the use of bank charge cards produces 
a mixture of transactions in which some represent merely the im-
plementation of a new payment mechanism, while others are a re-
placement for more traditional credit extensions. 
Thus, the characterization of a typical charge card sale as a 
credit transaction like those common in the past in the consumer 
field may be misleading. This is not to say that bank charge cards 
were not devised primarily as a method of extending a new form 
of credit. Using the best indicators available, consultants predicted 
to the banking industry certain market patterns that initially 
prompted banks to enter the field. They predicted that the ratio 
of persons purchasing goods and services and extending repayment 
over a period of time would be high in relation to those using the 
card as a new technique for immediate payment in lieu of checks or 
cash. The public proved the banks and their consultants to be in-
correct in their estimates. In 1967, Andrew Brimmer pointed out 
that "[m ]any holders of bank credit cards have used them primarily 
as a convenience in facilitating payments rather than as a means of 
increasing their debt balances."87 In other words, many cardholders 
do not contemplate deferred payments when they use their cards; 
they pay their entire balances as soon as billed. 
86. See Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer Credit Law, 
45 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 487 (1970). 
87. Hearings on H.R. 12616 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
!10th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967) (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, member Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). See also text accompanying note 7 supra. 
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The phenomenon noted by Mr. Brimmer now constitutes a fact 
of life that banks have begun to-and legislators should-take into 
careful consideration. At the time of the 1968 Federal Reserve Board 
study, transactions that were solely convenience-card or payment 
oriented in nature constituted between one-fifth and one-third of all 
transactions.88 There is evidence that such percentage increased by 
as much as forty per cent in the next l:lvo years.89 Figures assembled 
by one of the regional interchange associations indicate, for instance, 
that 538 million dollars in bank charge card sales and cash advances 
in 1970 gave rise to only a 45 million dollar increase in outstanding 
cardholder balances at the end of that year, as compared with 1969, 
when 368 million dollars in sales and advances generated a 48 mil-
lion dollar increase in outstanding balances. These statistics indicate 
that the ratio of charge card usage in terms of dollars to correspond-
ing credit balances generated increased from seven-to-one in 1969 to 
twelve-to-one in 1970, a period of just two years.00 One simply can-
not, therefore, proceed from the premise articulated by the con-
sumer advocates that bank charge card transactions represent simply 
another form of extending installment credit on a revolving basis. 
In the light of these figures, characterizing a "typical" charge card 
transaction today is a difficult task, but surely current statistics re-
lating to the ratio between those transactions that result in im-
mediate payment on billing and those that involve a repayment out 
of future income should form an important basis upon which to 
construct legislation. 
Statistics directly bearing on this phenomenon can be gathered, 
but the phenomenon can be deduced from other information as 
well. For example, the average dollar amount for all sales slips in 
1968 was approximately sixteen dollars;91 the average now appears 
to be approximately nineteen dollars.92 From this fact it seems clear 
that in the great majority of transactions conducted with bank charge 
cards, the purchase is probably not of the type that is made because 
88. Id. 
89. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1970, at 66, col. 7. 
90. Letter from E.H. Mackay, Executive Vice President, Western States Bankcard 
Association, San Francisco, California, to the authors, dated May 24, 1971, on file in 
the offices of the Michigan Law Review. 
91. Wall St. J., March 15, 1968, at 24, col. 2 (western ed.). A survey made for Time 
magazine indicates that the approximate charges on all bank charge cards used by a 
family in an average month were between $20 and $50. Who Uses Bank Credit Cards, 
AMERICAN DRUGGIST, February 9, 1970, at 79. See Bergsten, supra note 12, at 515-16. 
92. See note 16 supra. The average was derived by dividing $1.09 billion in Inter• 
bank member sales for the fourth quarter of 1970 by the 58 million sales slips processed 
for that period. 
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the purchaser does not have available funds and is anticipating 
paying for the purchase in installments out of future earnings. 
Rather, the purchaser simply finds it more convenient not to carry 
cash and to pay for all of his minor purchases at one time during a 
billing cycle. 
The premise upon which to proceed by analogy for the conven-
ience-card transaction is that of a cash sale. For these transactions, 
the charge card system, insofar as the merchant-cardholder relation-
ship is concerned, replaces cash. This premise has been stated suc-
cinctly: 
The retailer who accepts a credit card in payment does not normally 
think of the transaction as a a·edit transaction. Credit cards serve a 
function similar to that of checks. A retailer who accepts a check in 
payment for goods sold is thought of as engaging in a cash transac-
tion even though his receipt of cash is delayed until payment of the 
check.03 
As to such transactions, the cardholder should be in no better, 
nor worse, position than if he had paid for his purchase with cash. 
His recourse, just as if he had paid in cash, should be against the 
merchant. 
The problem, of course, is that it is impossible to identify in 
advance those transactions in which the consumer uses his charge 
card in place of cash. It may well be, however, that practical eco-
nomics should be determinative of the issue. A rule that would 
allow consumers to dispute the payment of obligations resulting 
from low-dollar-amount transactions would introduce severe disecon-
omies into a commercial transaction based on sophisticated processes. 
Charge card systems are an economically sound convenience for the 
public because of their capacity through a system that is highly de-
pendent on electronic data processing to process a high volume of 
consumer transactions at a low cost per item.94 As a percentage of the 
dollar value of the transaction, the processing cost obviously is 
greater as the dollar value of the transaction is less. Low-dollar-value 
transactions are, therefore, a burden on the system that is tolerated 
primarily for the public convenience because they represent no 
profit potential even when no disputed transactions are involved. 
"'Whenever manual processing must be introduced into the system, 
the cost of handling an item multiplies instead of increasing by some 
93. R. JOHNSON, R. JORDAN &: ·w. WARREN, ATIORNEY's GUIDE 'IO TRU'IH·IN·l.ENDING 
30 (1969). 
94. Bergsten, supra note 12, at 515-17. 
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marginal amount.95 Every charge back resulting from an alleged 
dissatisfaction would necessitate costly manual clerical processing. 
Issuer bank personnel would have to contact the debtor and ac-
cumulate enough data to complete documentation and process a 
charge back through the interchange system. Such a charge back, 
even once it is in process in the system, would be an exceptional 
item requiring special handling, thereby giving rise to extraordinary 
costs as it flowed back to the merchant. Again, the burden on low-
dollar-value items would be relatively greater. 
Any right on the part of the consumer to assert defenses against 
the issuer will place burdens on the system; but if the right is 
granted in all transactions, no matter how small, those burdens will 
be aggravated and may even be intolerable, both because of the high 
cost in relation to the dollar value of the transaction and because 
of the enormity of the volume of bank charge card transactions, which 
number more than five million per week.96 
The task of the legislature is to devise a technique that would dif-
ferentiate between those transactions that are a replacement for cash 
and those that replace other forms of credit and to treat those dis-
tinguishable transactions accordingly. There appears to be no method 
available for easily distinguishing between a credit and a convenience 
sale with precision, particularly since the decision to repay in install-
ments may not be made by the consumer until after billing. Hence 
any criterion used to treat transactions differently must be somewhat 
arbitrary. 
An arbitrary dollar figure should be selected. As to transactions 
involving a sum greater than that figure, the cardholder should be 
given the ability to assert against banks defenses he has against a 
merchant. As to transactions involving a sum less than that figure, 
it should be assumed that the charge card was used as a payment 
mechanism to replace cash, and the cardholder should have recourse 
only against the merchant. The figure chosen could be seventy-five 
dollars; it could be fifty dollars. The selection of an appropriate 
amount should be supported by an accumulation of data indicating 
any relationship that may exist between the size of the purchase and 
the likelihood of the transaction being one in which the consumer 
is seeking to make extended payments. 
Consumers do not seek credit through the creation of negotiable 
or assignable paper involving third party financial institutions for 
ten, fifteen, or twenty dollar purchases. Third party consumer credit 
95. Id. 
96. See note 18 supra. 
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is typically extended for the purpose of purchasing major appliances 
or other objects of comparatively high value. In those situations 
in which credit may be extended for smaller purchases, such as when 
a consumer may have a revolving charge account with a retailer, 
the consumer's obligation rarely, if ever, involves a negotiable in-
strument (other than a check) or the assignment of paper by the 
retailer to a financer. The party seeking to collect from the consumer 
in small-dollar-amount transactions will be the merchant against 
whom the consumer may assert defenses. Hence, it is not surprising 
that the issue of subjecting remote creditors to defenses in low-dollar-
amount transactions has not been faced before and that little prece-
dent exists in the consumer credit field for a technique of ascribing 
different rights to different dollar value transactions. 
Such an accommodation between economic practicality and en-
hancement of the rights of the individual consumer is not totally 
without precedent, however. The National Consumer Center sug-
gested a similar accommodation in its proposed National Consumer 
Act, perhaps the most consumer-oriented draft legislation promul-
gated to date. That Act would give consumers the absolute right to 
cancel a purchase of merchandise within three days of its purchase, 
no matter what the form of payment.97 The NCA limits that right, 
however, for economically sound reasons, to purchases of goods in 
excess of fifty dollars.98 Although the official comments give no in-
dication of the rationale for the provision, it seems a safe assump-
tion that the NCA's drafters determined that the societal costs 
involved in creating a rescission right with regard to purchases of less 
than fifty dollars were greater than the costs of making small-dollar-
amount purchases final. If that decision is correct for transactions 
involving only two parties-a merchant and a consumer-it would 
seem that the costs involved in "unwinding" a complex multiparty 
transaction would a fortiori render it a socially unwise rule to allow 
assertion of defenses against banks in transactions involving less 
than fifty dollars. Thus, a similar differentiation of transactions by 
dollar value should be useful in devising a workable rule for bank 
charge card transactions. The differentiated treatment would solve 
the intensely practical problem discussed above99 by eliminating 
costly economic burdens in low-dollar-amount transactions in which 
the potential for significant economic harm to the consumer is mini-
mal. Furthermore, it would relieve merchants from the possibility 
97. NCA § 2.505(2)(b) (First Final Draft). 
98. NCA § 2.501(1) (First Final Draft). 
99. See text accompanying note 94 supra. 
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that collection costs would exceed the value of disputed merchandise 
so that it would not be profitable for them to attempt to collect 
from a consumer if the consumer chose to dispute payments. Thus, 
new consumer rights would be created and would accomplish the 
goal of consumer advocates without, however, economically stifling 
a new and revolutionary payment system. 
C. A Geographic Limit 
Most consumer credit is local in nature. The consumer, the 
merchant from whom he purchases, and the financing institution 
that grants credit either through a direct loan or by purchasing ac-
counts receivable or negotiable paper from a merchant, are typically 
located in the same geographic area. Such is not the case, however, 
in bank charge card transactions. Distance, differences in local laws, 
and limitations on data processing capabilities all make disputes 
that arise between any of the three or more parties to a bank charge 
card transaction much less capable of economic resolution than the 
typical local credit transaction. Moreover, as was indicated above,100 
the issuer and depositary banks are typically different institutions 
and may be separated by thousands of miles. Thus, the second major 
distinction between other forms of consumer credit and the bank 
charge card is the geographic and functional dispersion of the par-
ties involved. 
It has been suggested that it would be proper to subject the 
issuer to defenses in those situations in which functional dispersion 
does not exist-that is, when the issuer also performs the function 
of a depositary bank-but not in those situations in which two 
different banks are involved.101 When the bank involved has not 
only issued the charge card to the consumer but also has a contrac-
tual arrangement with the merchant, it would at least theoretically 
have an opportunity to investigate the merchant, whether or not 
it would have the practical ability to conduct such an investigation. 
Furthermore, if the issuer and depositary bank are the same institu-
tion, it is statistically more likely that the transaction will have been 
100. See text accompanying notes 9 &: 10 supra. 
101. Bergsten, supra note 12, at 516. The NCA may have reached just that result: 
§ 2.407(9) would subject a credit card issuer to defenses in those situations in which 
"the creditor is the issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in the 
consumer sale or lease as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the 
seller or lessor." If this section is construed literally, it would allow consumers to 
assert defenses in lender charge card cases only when the depositary and issuer banks 
are the same institution or when organizations such as American Express or Diners 
Club are involved. A similar analysis can be made of the current Massachusetts legisla-
tion on this issue. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1970), 
.. 
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local. Bank charge cards are most typically issued by local offices of 
banks to residents of the immediately surrounding community, and 
the bank, in its depositary-bank role, will also have arrangements 
with merchants in its immediate community.102 Such geographic 
proximity facilitates contact by the bank with all parties to a poten-
tial dispute. The unfairness of depriving a merchant of his mer-
chandise and requiring him to proceed against a cardholder located 
at some distant point would be minimized. If the bank were per-
forming both functions, it would be more apt to promote an accom-
modation or to take action if it felt that either the merchant or 
the cardholder was being unfair. In effect it might act as an arbitra-
tor to the dispute. 
The major difficulty with treating transactions in which only one 
bank is involved differently from those in which two or more are in-
volved is that of making adequate disclosure to consumers so that 
they might know at the time they engage in a transaction whether 
they have the right to assert defenses only against the merchant or 
whether they might also assert them against the issuer. If the right to 
assert defenses against the issuer has any significance, the consumer 
should know whether the right is available to him at the moment he 
enters into the transaction. 
Traditionally, banks and other lenders, including merchants, 
seem to have granted consumer credit for major consumer purchases, 
such as automobiles, home appliances, major sports equipment, and 
major items of clothing. Such purchases are not usually made at 
points significantly distant from the consumer's residence for such 
reasons as high transportation costs and the consumer's lack of knowl-
edge concerning terms of the sale being offered and the reputation of 
the seller. Particularly for low-income consumers the potential shop-
ping area is limited.103 A feasible alternative, then, may be to grant 
consumers the right to assert defenses against banks in all transac-
tions in which the merchant and the cardholder reside in the same 
geographic area, as they are most likely to do in traditional consumer 
credit transactions. Because of the difficulties and costs that distance 
adds to dispute settlement, however, that additional right ought to 
be denied if the purchases are made from a merchant located at a 
point geographically distant from the consumer's residence. 
A geographic boundary could be established by the use of state 
• 102. An exception to the geographic proximity of merchants to their depositary 
bank arises when the merchant is a national concern such as a gasoline company, 
airline, or chain clothing store, which may have outlets located at great distances 
from the depositary bank. 
103. D. CAPLovnz, THE POOR PAY MORE 49-57 (1963). 
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boundaries,1°4 a circle surrounding the consumer's residence, or a 
combination of both. The alternatives would, just as with the selec-
tion of a dollar amount, necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. Each of 
the geographic limitations is based on the same practical premises, 
however. One premise is that the cardholder-issuer and merchant-
depositary bank relationships tend to be local. If a rule requires 
that the cardholder-merchant relationship also be local before de-
fenses can be asserted, the chances are good that all parties to a 
transaction will be located in the same geographic area. In fact, 
under such circumstances the statistical incidence of the issuer and 
depositary banks being the same institution would be greatly in-
creased. 
The other premise is that in local transactions the problem of 
merely establishing contact between the parties would be much easier 
to solve.105 The issuer may have a greater chance of evaluating the 
merchant. The merchant, if he has the sales slip charged back to him 
and therefore has been deprived not only of his merchandise but 
of his money as well, will at least be in a position easily to contact 
the cardholder or, if necessary, to seek relief through the courts. 
Under any of the suggested techniques for describing a boundary, 
the merchant is apt to have some familiarity with collection proce-
dures, attorneys, and creditors' remedies, so that his position will 
not be as adverse as if the sale had involved a cardholder located 
across the continent. And if a lawsuit is necessary, both the mer-
chant and the consumer will be reasonably close to the forum in 
which it will be conducted. 
The differences between the alternative forms of defining the 
appropriate geographic area are not great. The state boundary al-
ternative has the disadvantage of being the more arbitrary of the 
two, but has the advantage of being easier for a consumer to com-
104. Restricting a consumer's right to assert defenses to transactions that occur 
within the boundaries of the state in which he lives is a technique that has received 
the imprimatur of the National Consumer Center. In December 1970, the Consumer 
Center promulgated a document containing changes it advocated for the UCCC in 
states where it was being considered. Proposed § 3.410 extends, the concept contained in 
the official version of the UCCC to situations that could result in the assertion of de-
fenses against some direct lenders. In doing so, however, the suggested amendment to 
the UCCC would draw a geographic boundary that would allow defenses to be asserted 
only for intrastate transactions. National Consumer Law Center, Proposed Amendments 
to the 1968 Official Text of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3.410 (Publication 
#Al92-50, Dec. 17, 1970). 
105. The National Consumer Center predicated its suggested expansion of rights 
against lenders, which include the limitation to intrastate transactions (see note 104 
supra), upon the desire to impose subjection to defenses "in circumstances where the 
extender of credit could reasonably be expected to know of the seller's manner of 
doing business and responsibility •••• " Comment to Proposed New § 3.410, id. 
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prehend in making his marketing decisions. It also has the disad-
vantage of treating states with large areas the same as states with 
small areas. The distance between Redding and San Diego, Cali-
fornia would span many states in other parts of the country. On 
the other hand, insofar as legislation dealing with this issue may be 
enacted by several states prior to the enactment of a federal statute, 
the notion that a rule governing rights in a transaction will encom-
pass the entire state seems to provide a certain desirable simplicity. 
A circle surrounding the consumer's residence is a more rational 
method for defining the area, however, since it takes into account 
the major factor that creates difficulties-distance. It would also 
protect consumers who shop in major market areas that cross state 
lines. If a reasonable radius is selected, such as seventy-five miles, 
one would find encompassed such multistate metropolitan markets 
as New York City, which services areas in New Jersey and Connecti-
cut; Washington, D.C., which services areas in Virginia and Mary-
land; Cincinnati, which services areas in Indiana and Kentucky; and 
Chicago, which services areas in Wisconsin and Indiana, to name but 
a few. The consumer would know in advance that he would be able 
to assert defenses against his issuer provided that he made the pur-
chase within seventy-five miles of his residence. Unfortunately, as he 
approached the geographic limit of the circle surrounding his resi-
dence, the consumer might not be certain whether he would still be 
in the zone affording him such additional protection. To the extent 
that the existence of such doubt is undesirable, the state border 
alternative becomes more attractive. 
The alternative of allowing the consumer to assert defenses 
against the issuer regardless of the distance between his residence 
and the merchant's establishment seems unacceptable. It would be 
apt to cause serious limitations on the consumers' present ability to 
use bank charge cards nationally and internationally. As indicated 
earlier,106 when a considerable geographic dispersion exists between 
the cardholder and the merchant, and the cardholder disputes a 
billing by a bank, the likely result is that the bank will not attempt 
collection but will charge back the sales slip to the merchant, who 
will be left with a difficult or impossible collection task. Being un-
able to evaluate consumers for good faith, merchants would thus 
have an incentive to discontinue accepting offered charge cards from 
consumers as payment for goods and services. On the other hand, a 
rule limiting geographically the additional right to assert defenses 
against banks is unlikely to be a burden on the consuming public 
106. See text accompanying note 72 supra. 
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because most major purchases are undoubtedly made near the con-
sumer's residence. Unscrupulous merchants would be in no position 
to use bank charge cards as a replacement for the creation of con-
sumer paper in these local transactions in order to avoid the imposi-
tion of defenses. Since transactions in which consumer paper is 
generated are normally local in nature, a geographic limitation 
would not lessen the effect of foreclosing such a device to mer-
chants seeking an unfair advantage. 
VII. AN AccoMMODATION Is NECESSARY 
Legislatures must approach the issue under discussion with care 
and with a willingness to achieve a true understanding of the nature 
of a highly complex, sophisticated and, therefore, sensitive system. 
An unwise law may prove onerous to all parties involved. Unfor-
tunately, there are no indicators of what the effect of an unwise rule 
would be. Extrapolating from those few jurisdictions that have ex-
tended to consumers the right to assert defenses against banks would 
be an erroneous method of forecasting since it is unlikely that con-
sumers are even aware that they have such a right in those juris-
dictions. Absent that awareness, statistical data on the experience 
to date under such a rule would be worse than useless-it would 
be misleading. 
Some prediction of the possible results of an unworkable rule 
can be made. Banks will probably try to assure that they are in-
demnified for liability falling on them as a result of a merchant's 
activities since they will probably not be able to police the mer-
chant's activities in the first instance. They may do business with 
only those businessmen with sufficient financial resources to insure 
that, if defenses were ever successfully asserted against the bank, 
the bank could always recover from the merchant. Second, they may 
require merchants to maintain significant amounts on deposit as a 
reserve against which they may charge off debts that consumers re-
fuse to pay. 
The effect of such measures, resulting from a rule exposing banks 
to consumer defenses in all transactions, would constitute a severe 
blow to this country's small businessmen since it would place them 
at an even greater competitive disadvantage than they suffer from 
today. Thus Congress, with its evident concern with the plight of 
small businessmen,107 may have to fashion carefully a compromise 
solution that considers the position of both consumers and small 
107. See generally SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE IMPACT OF CREDIT CAlUlS 
ON SMALL BUSINESS, H.R. REP. No. 91-1500, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings pur-
suant to H.R. Res. 66 Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the 
Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
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businessmen. Small businessmen typically begin their business lives 
with a small amount of capital. However honorable they may be in 
their business techniques, and no matter what the quality of goods 
and services they offer, this fact alone tends to place them at a 
competitive disadvantage. Multiparty charge card programs have al-
lowed small merchants who cannot establish their mvn card programs 
or revolving charge accounts to compete with larger businesses that 
have their mvn systems. If banks are made subject to consumer de-
fenses, a bank may impose financial requirements on those who will 
be allowed to honor charge cards that small businesses may be un-
able to meet.108 A rule establishing across-the-board bank liability 
to consumer defenses could have, then, as one of its pernicious 
effects the exclusion of small businesses from bank charge card 
systems and their attendant benefits. 
It could well be argued that if charge cards are becoming a new 
medium of exchange for the convenience of the public, if they are 
replacing cash and checks, their universal acceptance by all mer-
chants, large or small, carriage trade or discount house, chain store or 
thinly capitalized "mom and pop" grocery store, is desirable. The 
freedom of the consumer to shop where he chooses depends on such 
universality of acceptance of the payment mechanism he chooses. 
Consumer advocates propose a broad rule of law designed to exclude 
certain merchants from bank charge card systems because of their 
business practices;100 but such a rule will likely exclude, for financial 
reasons only, many small merchants as well. Competitive disadvan-
tage because of an inability to accept the financial burdens associated 
with a medium of exchange seems undesirable. Further, as charge 
card transactions assume an even larger share of total retail sales, the 
ability of a merchant to remain in business may one day depend on 
whether he accepts charge cards. When that day arrives, a reappraisal 
is likely to be made of a system that requires one private sector of 
the economy, the banking industry, to decide, in effect, whether a 
merchant must close his doors. The appropriateness of vesting that 
responsibility in the banking industry deserves careful consideration 
today, since such an effect is reasonably predictable. 
In addition to having adverse effects on consumers and merchants, 
a broad rule could also work significant hardships on the banking 
industry. The highly regulated environment in which financing insti-
tutions operate renders them peculiarly vulnerable to any ill-con-
108. The New York Times, under the heading "Dealers Assail Legislation," described 
the unhappy experience of boat dealers under a recent legislative amendment in New 
York, which on its face affected only banks by permitting consumers to assert claims 
against the financing bank in boat sales. N.Y. Times, Ja:i. 24, 1971, § 12, at I, col. 6. 
109. See text accompan}ing note 29 supra. 
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ceived restructuring of risk allocation. As a matter of simple econom-
ics, lenders may not be proper parties to subject to consumer defenses 
in a broad range of cases since such an allocation would in tum force 
them to restructure their business relationship with both merchants 
and the consuming public.110 Moreover, the theory of risk shifting, 
when advocated to support imposition of liability on suppliers, 
assumes the ability of the supplier to raise prices and thereby redis-
tribute a risk of loss from one consumer to many.111 Lenders, how-
ever, may not be able to distribute the risk through price increases. 
In most jurisdictions, their charges are controlled by statute.112 Thus, 
one of the foundations of extended notions of liability is not present 
when lenders are involved. For them, too onerous a rule can only 
result in the restructuring or elimination of the services now pro-
vided.113 
The complete elimination of charge card service by banks is not 
so unlikely a result if too onerous a rule is imposed. Rather than 
issuing charge cards, banks could rely more heavily on check over-
draft and check guarantee plans, which would allow a consumer to 
write checks in excess of amounts on deposit with the bank with the 
excess charged against an open-end credit account.114 Under no 
theory yet advanced would a bank be subject to defenses assertable 
against a merchant who accepted a check drawn on an account in 
that bank. Ironically, consumers could obtain credit under such a 
plan, but they would have no right to assert defenses against the 
bank, even for major purchases. Moreover, the widespread use of 
HO. Cf. Connor v. Great Western Sav. &: Loan Assn., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 872-73, 447 
P.2d 609, 621-22, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 381-82 (1968) Gustice Mosk, dissenting). 
lll. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 45ll, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 
(1944) Gustice Traynor, concurring); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, ll20-22 (1960). 
ll2. See generally l CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,i 510 (1971). 
ll3. A recent study conducted by the Graduate School of Business Administration 
of the University of Washington examined the effects of the lowering of the maximum 
allowable interest rate in consumer credit transactions from l½ per cent to 1 per cent 
per month in the State of Washington. Sixty-six per cent of the retailers interviewed 
reported that they reject applicants for credit that they would have accepted prior 
to the lowering of the rate. The summary of findings concludes: "The low-income 
people who are marginal credit risks seem to have suffered the most so far from the 
enactment of Initiative 245." GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, THE IMPAcr OF A CONSUMER CREDIT INTEREST LIMITATION 
LAw 25 (1970). That finding illustrates a likely result of the imposition of increased 
burdens on an industry that cannot raise its prices because they are legislatively 
controlled. Increased burdens may mean reduced net income, not -loss shifting, to 
creditors. No business will operate for long at a loss. At some point, therefore, since 
income cannot be raised, reductions in the costs of operation of charge card services 
will be sought, perhaps through a restriction on the class of consumers serviced, as in 
Washington, or through a diminution in the value of the services offered. 
114. See generally Comment, Bank Credit Plans, supra note 26. 
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check overdraft plans in lieu of credit card systems would have 
another untoward consequence for consumers. Merchants often will 
not accept checks as a replacement for cash without personal knowl-
edge of the drawer. Instead of having a new form of payment avail-
able worldwide, the increasingly mobile consumer would be forced 
to less convenient mediums of exchange in most nonlocal transac-
tions. 
Thus a rule exposing banks to consumer defenses in all trans-
actions could cause serious consequences to banks, merchants, and 
consumers. On the other hand, a rule insulating banks from con-
sumer defenses in all transactions may place too heavy a burden on 
the consumer. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
If the current movement to subject financers to defenses in 
transactions in which the seller initially extends credit to the con-
sumer is soundly based, then some change in the current doctrine 
that insulates banks from consumer defenses is called for in bank 
charge card transactions. The judiciary should not undertake that 
task, however. For purposes of uniformity, Congress would be the 
best body to deal with the issue. It is clear, however, that Congress 
must proceed with a full awareness of the special nature of the 
transaction involved. 
This Article has discussed the nature of bank charge card trans-
actions, with emphasis on two factors deemed of particular impor-
tance in determining whether the consumer should be permitted to 
assert against the issuing bank defenses that he has against the seller. 
The first factor is the extent of geographic and functional dispersion 
among the parties to the transaction; the second is the relation be-
tween the amount of a particular transaction and the economic 
feasibility of providing an alternative party against whom the con-
sumer can assert defenses arising out of the sale. A practical reason 
that these factors are important to the resolution of the issue under 
discussion is the burden that the indiscriminate assertion of consumer 
defenses against issuing banks would place on the charge card system. 
The consumer may, of course, assert claims against the merchant 
from which he purchased goods or services. However, the societal 
costs of providing the consumer with the option of asserting de-
fenses against the bank attempting to collect an amount due, 
thereby giving him the tactical advantage of not having to assume 
the initiative in advancing his claim against the merchant, are 
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simply prohibitive in small-dollar-amount transactions and in those 
transactions geographically distant from the cardholder's residence. 
A second reason for the importance of these factors is conceptual 
in nature and rests on the notion that the charge card transaction 
will be substituting for either a cash transaction or a traditional con-
sumer credit transaction. It is clear that one cannot definitively 
ascertain in any particular transaction which role the credit card 
is playing. The best that can be done in any resolution of the ques-
tion is to formulate presumptions based on observable facts asso-
ciated with the particular sale and typically connected with one 
type of transaction or the other. Although any lines would to some 
extent be arbitrary, the need for consistency and predictability within 
commerce makes them necessary. Such lines, embodied in the mone-
tary and geographic tests set out above,115 rest on two assumptions. 
First, sales over a certain monetary limit will, more often than not, 
represent credit rather than cash transactions. Second, the kinds of 
items that are generally bought by means of consumer credit are of 
such a nature that typically they will not be purchased at a significant 
distance from the consumer's residence. If it is determined from these 
factors that the charge card transaction was equivalent to a credit 
sale, the consumer's right to assert defenses should not be diluted 
merely because the issuing bank, rather than the merchant, is in 
the position of creditor vis-a-vis the consumer. Likewise, if it is deter-
mined that the transaction is equivalent to a cash sale, there seems 
to be no reason to enlarge the consumer's options beyond what they 
would be in an ordinary cash sale by permitting him to assert de-
fenses to the issuing bank's attempted collection of amount due. 
This is not to say that the inquiry should end with a disposition 
of these issues. Many segments of the business, financial, and consum-
ing communities will assuredly raise additional issues at legislative 
hearings now in progress.116 This analysis, it is hoped, will help pro-
mote an understanding of bank charge card systems and provide a 
first step toward the accommodation of conflicting interests that must 
be served in any legislation dealing with this dramatic innovation in 
payment mechanisms and credit-granting techniques. 
115 See text accompanying notes 87-98 and 100-07 supra. 
116. Such additional issues may include matters such as the maximum amount owed 
to an issuer by an obliger on a series of transactions against which an obliger can 
assert a defense arising out of a single transaction, whether a time limit should be im• 
posed on the consumer's right to assert defenses, and whether the consumer should be 
required to demand an adjustment from the merchant before asserting a defense 
against the bank. As to the first issue, Idaho, in recently adopting the UCCC, included 
a FIFO rule that would allow defenses to be asserted only against amounts outstanding 
on the particular transaction involved. Ch. 299, § 2.404, [1971] Idaho Acts (I CCH 
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1J 4805, at 5!l!l6 (1971)). 
